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The spate of cases dealing with the question of whether a liquidator can treat the costs of any
litigation that she initiates or pursues in the exercise of her statutory functions as a liquidation
expense payable in priority to other creditors shows no sign of abating. This is hardly surprising
bearing in mind that a number of issues were left unresolved by the Court of Appeal in Re Floor
Fourteen Ltd, Lewis v Inland Revenue Commissioners. 1 One such case, Re Demaglass Ltd, Lewis v
Dempster 2 is the subject of this note. The likely implications of the Insolvency (Amendment) (No. 2)
Rules 20023 are also briefly considered.
Facts
In Demaglass, the relevant companies were concurrently in administrative receivership and
liquidation. The liquidators applied for an order requiring the receivers to pay them a sum out of
floating charge realisations to enable the liquidators to fund an investigation with a view to possible
litigation. It was taken as read that liquidation expenses are payable out of floating charge assets in
the hands of an administrative receiver. In other words, the correctness of the Court of Appeal's
interpretation of the Insolvency Act 1986, s.175 arrived at in Re Leyland Daf Ltd, Buchler v Talbot 4
was assumed. Thus, the main question was whether the liquidators were entitled to call for the
establishment of a “fighting fund” and this, in turn, depended on whether the items of anticipated
future expenditure were liquidation expenses.
Decision
In the light of the House of Lords decision in Re Toshoku Finance (UK) Plc, Kahn v Inland Revenue
Commissioners, 5 it was common ground that r.4.218 of the Insolvency Rules 19866 is “a complete
statement of liquidation expenses, subject only to the qualifications contained in the Rules
themselves”.7 The first and key issue arising for determination was whether prospective *Comp. Law.
85 expenditure, as opposed to expenditure already incurred, could be recovered in principle under
r.4.218. The liquidators contended that their claim fell within all or any of paragraphs (a), (m) and (n)
of r.4.218(1). The deputy judge rejected this contention on the following grounds:
(1) The heads of expense set out in r.4.218(1) were all couched in the past tense suggesting that an
item of expenditure can only be treated as a liquidation expense if it has already been paid or
incurred. The word “expenses” denoted sums of money that had been expended. It would also extend
to liabilities that had actually been incurred but not yet paid.
(2) The references to “disbursements” in paragraph (m) and “remuneration and emoluments” in
paragraph (n) were clearly references to sums already expended, a point reinforced in the case of
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paragraph (n) by the use of the past tense in the phrase “any person who has been employed”.
(3) Similarly, r.4.218(1)(a) could not be construed as entitling a liquidator to call on floating charge
realisations held by a receiver in order to fund future activities. The phrase “expenses … incurred”
could not possibly refer to prospective expenditure or liabilities that had not yet arisen. The phrase
“expenses … chargeable … by the … liquidator” referred to expenses or liabilities that had been
incurred but not yet paid. It should not be construed as having a forward-looking effect. Moreover, the
expenses within paragraph (a) had to be “properly” chargeable or incurred and it was difficult to see
how a judgment could be made about that unless a liability to make payment had already arisen.
(4) In principle, a fiduciary was not normally entitled to withdraw money from funds under her control
until a positive event had arisen entitling her to make the withdrawal.
In the light of this reasoning, it was unnecessary for the deputy judge to decide whether the
prospective expenditure was of a type falling within the substantive heads of r.4.218(1). However, as
all the expenditure related to the investigation and pursuit of a range of possible clawback
proceedings, he held that it could not have been treated as a liquidation expense in any event
following the line of authority commencing with Re MC Bacon Ltd (No. 2) 8 and culminating in Re
Floor Fourteen Ltd, Lewis v Inland Revenue Commissioners. 9
The second issue was whether the liquidators could claim the costs of prospective proceedings out of
the assets of the companies in priority to other creditors under the court's inherent jurisdiction. In
Floor Fourteen, Peter Gibson L.J. refused to speculate about the precise source and scope of the
court's discretion under the inherent jurisdiction. However, the position was clarified in Toshoku
Finance where Lord Hoffmann10 identified Re London Metallurgical Co 11 as the original source of the
discretion, adding that it had been preserved in what is now r.4.220(2). Thus, the inability of a
liquidator to claim her costs out of the assets under r.4.218 is not necessarily the end of the matter.
However, in Demaglass the deputy judge held that r.4.220(2) did not assist the liquidators because it
had not been invoked and, in any event, could only be invoked with regard to costs already incurred.
The third issue was whether, in an appropriate case, a liquidator could seek a declaration in advance
as to whether prospective expenditure would fall within the established categories of liquidation
expense once it had actually been incurred. The deputy judge saw no reason in principle why a
liquidator should not be able to make such an application (indeed, he thought that Floor Fourteen
involved this kind of application) but there would need to be sufficient detail for the court to assess
whether the expenditure would be properly incurred.12 So it appears that there is scope for the
development of a pre-emptive costs jurisdiction along the lines of the well-established Beddoe
jurisdiction governing the treatment of costs incurred by trustees in the execution of the trust.13
However, it will always be difficult for a court to judge whether or not the prospective expenditure is
justifiable.14
Comment
The Demaglass decision provides further confirmation, if any were needed, that r.4.218 is, by and
large, an exhaustive code. Generally speaking, an item of expenditure can only be treated as a
liquidation expense if:
(i) it is of a type falling within the categories in r.4.218(1); and
(ii) it has already been expended or incurred.
The effect of r.4.220(2) is that the court has a discretion to order costs incurred “in the course of legal
proceedings by or against the company” to be paid out of the assets. In this respect, Demaglass
builds on Lord Hoffmann's observations in Toshoku and it also holds out the possibility that liquidators
may in future be able to seek some form of anticipatory relief perhaps by way of analogy to that which
has evolved for trustees in the wake of Re Beddoe. 15
It is important to note that r.4.218(1)(a) of the Insolvency Rules has been amended by the Insolvency
(Amendment) (No. 2) Rules 2002.16 The amended rule only applies to companies that go into
liquidation after January 1, 2003.17 The effect of the amendment is to broaden the scope of the rule
with the result that expenses or costs “relating to the conduct of any legal proceedings which [the
liquidator] has power to bring or defend whether in his own name or the name of the company” are
recoverable as liquidation expenses as well as expenses or costs “properly chargeable or incurred …
in preserving, realising or getting in any of the assets of the company”. This means that costs incurred
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by a liquidator in bringing statutory clawback18 or wrongful trading proceedings19 now fall within r.
4.218 whereas before the amendment the courts had held consistently that even the costs of
successful litigation of this nature fell outside the scope of the rule and could not be treated as a
liquidation expense.20 However, the liquidator will still have to demonstrate that the costs were
“properly chargeable or incurred” and, so to cover herself, she may wish to apply for a declaration that
prospective costs will be treated as a liquidation expense once they have been incurred. It will be
interesting to see if a pre-emptive costs jurisdiction along the lines contemplated by the deputy judge
in Demaglass takes root.
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